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RIDING THE RHINO: ATTEMPTING TO 
DEVELOP USABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 
COMBAT ACTIVITIES 
William J. Fenrick*
Abstract: The body of law regulating combat activities is, essentially, a body 
of preventive law which should be applied in military training, planning, 
and operations to minimize net human suffering and net destruction of 
civilian objects in armed conºict. Prosecution for violations of such law is 
uncommon. Such prosecutions have, however, been conducted before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This 
Article reviews the relevant jurisprudence of the ICTY and asserts that ef-
fective prosecution for combat offences, such as unlawful attacks, can be 
conducted before non-specialist tribunals and that these prosecutions can 
both strengthen the law and elaborate upon its substantive provisions. 
Introduction 
 When new civilian staff members arrive in Baghdad, they land at 
the airport and then travel to the well-protected Green Zone in a heav-
ily armored bus, which is in convoy with helicopter gunships ºying 
overhead and armored vehicles as ground escorts. The bus is known 
colloquially as the Rhino. Riding the Rhino gives the passengers an 
acute sense of the dangers of the combat environment and of both the 
fragility and the importance of the body of law that purports to govern 
combat. Regrettably, but inevitably, combat is about killing people and 
breaking things. 
 The body of law regulating combat activities is International Hu-
manitarian Law (IHL). The fundamental objective of IHL is to reduce 
net human suffering and net destruction of civilian objects in armed 
conºict. It is, essentially, a body of preventive law that, to be effective, 
must be incorporated into the training and doctrine of armed forces 
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before armed conºict occurs, and then applied by armed forces, and 
others engaged in the conduct of armed conºict, once a conºict oc-
curs. Generally speaking, its practitioners are lawyers afªliated with the 
Red Cross or lawyers advising armed forces. IHL practitioners practice 
preventive law, the avoidance of violations, not litigation. IHL is a ªeld 
of public international law and its sources are the accepted sources of 
public international law, primarily treaties and custom. The treaties 
have been developed in international negotiating forums by delega-
tions from foreign ministries and defense departments. The treaties 
have been applied, and customary law has been developed by states, 
primarily foreign ministries and defense departments. Traditionally, 
IHL expertise has reposed in a relatively small group of lawyers in gov-
ernment or in the academic community. 
 More recently, lawyers from human rights-oriented nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), such as Human Rights Watch and Am-
nesty International, have had an increasing impact on the development 
of IHL treaties, such as the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Land 
Mines. In addition, NGOs have become much more vigorous critics of 
ongoing military combat activity.1 Somewhat similarly, developments in 
international criminal law, speciªcally the establishment of ad hoc tri-
bunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), and their consequential jurisprudence have had an impact on 
the content of IHL. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is ex-
pected to have a similar impact in future. 
 IHL can no longer be regarded as the exclusive professional pre-
serve of a relatively small group of law professors or of a slightly larger 
group of practitioners engaged in the practice of preventive law. It is 
entering the legal mainstream and, as a result, one can expect IHL is-
sues to be addressed by non-traditional groups and, on occasion, by 
legal generalists. Although the beneªts of ignorance as a spur to crea-
tivity or outside the box thinking can easily be exaggerated, this is not 
necessarily an entirely negative development. IHL must be, or become, 
healthy enough to withstand an assault by legal generalists. At the same 
time, one must ensure that the tail does not wag the dog and that due 
regard continues to be paid to the primarily preventive role of IHL. In 
                                                                                                                      
1 E.g., Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian 
Casualties in Iraq (2003); Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via: “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO 
During Operation Allied Force (2000), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/ 
kosovo/docs/nato_all.pdf. 
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particular, one must not develop perfect standards in the courtroom or 
in academic literature which are simply impossible for the soldiers to 
obey while still surviving. 
 The principle of distinction is the fundamental principle of IHL. 
Essentially, military forces are obligated to distinguish between military 
objectives, such as combatants and civilians taking a direct part in hos-
tilities, on the one hand, and civilian objects and civilians not taking a 
direct part in hostilities on the other hand. If this principle is not ac-
cepted, there is no body of law regulating combat activities. The appli-
cation of this principle implicitly contains a prohibition of (1) attacks 
directed against civilians or civilian objects; (2) indiscriminate attacks 
that fail to distinguish between those people and objects who may be 
attacked and those who may not be attacked; and (3) attacks directed 
against legitimate targets that are expected to inºict disproportionate 
death, injury, or damage to people or objects who should not be at-
tacked. As an unavoidable statement of fact, there is such a thing as law-
ful collateral injury that may be inºicted during the course of a lawful 
attack. Prior to the establishment of the ICTY, there was no signiªcant 
body of case law purporting to address combat activities, particularly 
the unlawful attack issue, or the related issues of what constitutes a mili-
tary objective: when is a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities, how 
does one measure (dis)proportionality, and when is an attack indis-
criminate? The purpose of this Article is to address how the tribunals, 
particularly the ICTY, have addressed the application of the principle of 
distinction, and whether they may be expected to contribute to the de-
velopment of common standards which legal advisers (involved in ad-
vising military commanders) and those who may be perceived by the 
military community as ofªcious bystanders (such as lawyers and judges 
involved in administering justice in related cases and NGOs engaged in 
critiquing military conduct) may use. 
 Assuming a judicial hierarchy and an elaborated rule of prece-
dent is necessary for the existence of a body of common law, it is 
unlikely there will be a common law for the various international or 
mixed tribunals addressing IHL issues.2 Tribunal jurisprudence, how-
ever, may contribute to a common discourse, which may become cus-
tomary law if decisions are well reasoned and deal with common 
problems. This contribution may, of course, be attenuated if the vari-
                                                                                                                      
2 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 80–171 ( July 15, 1999) 
(ICTY Appeals Chamber discussing and discarding the approach taken by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case in determining whether or not a conºict 
should be regarded as international). 
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ous tribunals are rooted in statutes or treaties which use different 
words to address similar problems. 
 The common discourse concerning the principle of distinction 
involves a variety of participants in a variety of forums, not all of which 
are essentially “legal,” including both military/legal training, planning 
and operations forums, and ofªcious bystanders/external reviewers 
such as those involved in the judicial process or NGOs. There is a high 
risk of a two-track approach to the development of this body of law be-
cause military participants in the discourse are, perhaps excessively, se-
curity conscious. We may see one version of the law developed by mili-
tary participants, with an in-depth understanding of relevant facts and 
relevant technology (i.e., hothouse law) and another version developed 
by external reviewers denied access to such information. The two-track 
approach can result in distortions on each track. The military partici-
pants may develop a version that is too pro- military and does not bene-
ªt from informed external criticism, while the external reviewers may 
develop a version that is simply unrealistic. There will always be a de-
gree of tension between military participants, who wish to preserve the 
maximum degree of discretion for their clients, and external reviewers, 
with the desire to develop the law in a progressive direction. Increased 
interaction between the groups is desirable, however, to improve the 
quality of analysis and perhaps encourage the emergence of an in-
formed progressive view. 
 This Article will ªrst provide an overview of ICTY unlawful attack 
decisions as they involve the application of the principle of distinc-
tion. It will then address the concept of military objectives, the con-
cept of proportionality, the legal basis for unlawful attack charges, and 
the elements of unlawful attack charges. This Article will then address 
two issues speciªcally related to criminal prosecution: the relationship 
between unlawful attack charges and other charges, and how to estab-
lish a broad picture from a limited number of instances. 
I. Overview of ICTY Unlawful Attack Decisions 
 There is a dearth of war crimes cases focusing on unlawful attacks, 
perhaps because such cases have been regarded as simply too difªcult 
to prosecute.3 Recently, the Ofªce of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the 
                                                                                                                      
 
3 In the only marginally relevant World War II war crimes decision, it was considered 
lawful to direct ªre at civilians attempting to ºee a besieged area in order to keep them 
within the besieged area where they might drain the resources available to the besieged 
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ICTY has conducted such prosecutions.4 Unlawful attack charges have 
been or are being considered by the ICTY in four cases to date. 
 In Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic 5 and in Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and 
Mario Cerkez,6 the accused were Bosnian-Croat leaders and the cases 
revolved around several incidents in the Lasva River Valley in Bosnia, 
in particular the Ahmici massacre in which many of the inhabitants of 
a small Bosnian Muslim village were killed when it was overrun by 
Bosnian-Croat forces. Blaskic was the ªrst case before the ICTY to ad-
dress unlawful attack charges. At trial, Blaskic was found guilty of the 
crime against humanity of persecution and of the war crime of unlaw-
ful attacks on civilians, among other charges, and sentenced to forty-
ªve years’ imprisonment.7
 The Blaskic Trial Chamber decision contained very little legal 
analysis and what there was focused primarily on the crime against 
humanity of persecution.8 A substantial amount of new evidence was 
considered in the Blaskic Appeal Decision and the ªndings were re-
versed on several counts and the accused’s sentence reduced to nine 
years’ imprisonment, the time he had served at the date of judg-
ment.9 Both Kordic and Cerkez were convicted at trial of a number of 
counts related to persecutions, unlawful attacks, and other crimes and 
sentenced to twenty-ªve years’ imprisonment and ªfteen years’ im-
prisonment respectively, although Cerkez was acquitted with respect 
                                                                                                                      
forces. U.N. War Crimes Commission, The German High Command Trial, 12 L. Rep. Trials 
War Criminals 1, 84 (1949). 
4 Unlawful attack charges have been considered in the following ICTY cases: Prosecu-
tor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement ( Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Galic, Case 
No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion (Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, 
Case No. IT-95-14/2, Judgement (Feb. 26, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case 
No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgement (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-
95-14-T, Trial Judgement (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Ap-
peals Judgement ( July 29, 2004). They were also considered in Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 
Case No. IT-02-54-T, but this case was terminated by the death in custody of the accused. 
This Article will focus primarily on the Galic and Strugar cases as these are the two in 
which, to date, issues related to unlawful attack have been addressed and discussed in the 
most elaborate fashion. 
5 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgement (Mar. 3, 2000). 
6 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Judgement (Feb. 26, 2001). 
7 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgement, pt. VI. 
8 William J. Fenrick, A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities Offences: Comments 
on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, 13 Leiden J. Int’l 
L. 931, 946–47 (2000). 
9 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgement, pt. XIII ( July 29, 
2004). 
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to the charges related to the Ahmici massacre.10 As with Blaskic, the 
Kordic and Cerkez Trial Chamber decision contained very little legal 
analysis related to unlawful attacks.11 Kordic’s sentence was afªrmed 
on appeal and that of Cerkez was reduced to six years’ imprisonment. 
 General Galic was the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army 
(RSK) Sarajevo Rumania Corps, the force surrounding Sarajevo, from 
September 10, 1992 to August 10, 1994. He was charged with individual 
criminal responsibility for inºicting terror on the civilian population of 
Sarajevo, for attacking civilians, and for the crimes against humanity of 
murder and causing inhumane acts.12 The underlying basis for the 
charges were alleged protracted sniping and shelling campaigns upon 
the civilian population during which large numbers of civilians were 
killed or wounded. General Galic was convicted of ordering the inºic-
tion of terror and crimes against humanity and given a sentence of 
twenty years’ imprisonment.13 The Court dismissed the unlawful attack 
counts because they were regarded as being assimilated into the inºic-
tion of terror count.14 Judge Nieto-Navia ªled a strong dissenting opin-
ion.15 The decision, which is currently under appeal,16 contains a thor-
ough analysis of the law relating to unlawful attacks and to the 
inºiction of terrorism and also addresses how one must prove the exis-
tence of a sustained campaign.17
 The Strugar case18 revolves primarily around the events of a single 
day, although evidence of what happened before and after is essential 
to appraising culpability for these events. General Strugar, Commander 
of the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija ( JNA) (the Yugoslav People’s 
Army) 2nd Operational Group (2 OG), which surrounded the Croa-
tian city of Dubrovnik, was charged with responsibility for the unlawful 
attacks on civilian and civilian objects in the Old Town of Dubrovnik on 
December 6, 1991. In the early morning of December 6, a small unit of 
the JNA attempted to capture a strong point at Srd, a hill above Du-
                                                                                                                      
10 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95–14/2, Judgement, pt. V (Feb. 26, 
2001). 
11 Id. ¶¶ 321–328. 
12 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion (Dec. 5, 2003). 
13 Id. pt. VI. 
14 Id. ¶ 752. 
15 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Nieto-Navia (Dec. 5, 2003). 
16 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgement (Nov. 30, 2006). 
17 See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 13–138, 
582–94 (Dec. 5, 2003). See generally Daniela Kravetz, The Protection of Civilians in War: The 
ICTY’s Galic Case, 17 Leiden J. Int’l L. 521–36 (2004). 
18 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement ( Jan. 31, 2005). 
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brovnik. Croatian forces in and around Dubrovnik responded and the 
attacking JNA unit became bogged down and began taking casualties. 
JNA mortars, recoilless guns, and wire-guided rockets were ªred at Du-
brovnik. A large number of these munitions landed in the Old Town of 
Dubrovnik, a distinct area adjacent to the rest of Dubrovnik which con-
tained nothing but specially protected civilian objects and civilians, 
causing death or injury to civilians and substantial damage to several 
specially protected civilian structures. 
 Initially, four persons were indicted in connection with the inci-
dent: Army Captain Kovacevic, who commanded the Third Battalion of 
the 472nd Motorized Brigade, the unit principally responsible for the 
unlawful attack; Admiral Jokic, Captain Kovacevic’s superior and com-
mander of the Ninth Military Naval Sector; Naval Captain Zec, Admiral 
Jokic’s Chief of Staff; and General Strugar, commander the 2 OG and 
Admiral Jokic’s superior. Charges were withdrawn without prejudice 
against Naval Captain Zec. Army Captain Kovacevic was the subject of 
the Prosecutor’s Rule 11 bis motion for referral of the indictment to 
another court. Admiral Jokic submitted a guilty plea and was sentenced 
to seven years’ imprisonment,19 and the trial of General Strugar pro-
ceeded with Admiral Jokic as one of the main witnesses against him. 
General Strugar was found guilty, based on command responsibility, of 
attacks on civilians and of destruction or willful damage to protected 
buildings and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.20 Although the 
court found that all of the elements of the other counts, including at-
tacks on civilian objects, had been established, it considered the of-
fenses for which it did make a guilty ªnding to most accurately encap-
sulate the criminal conduct.21
I. Military Objectives 
 Military objectives, that is, persons and objects subject to attack, 
are: 
 (i) combatants;22
                                                                                                                      
19 Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶¶ 9–11, 116 
(Mar. 18, 2004), aff’d, Case No. 1-A (Aug. 30, 2005). 
20 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, ¶¶ 477–83. 
21 Id. ¶¶ 447–55. See generally F.L. Pola & E.C. Rojo, The Strugar Case Before the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 18 J. Int’l L. Peace & Armed Conºict 
139–45 (2005). 
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conºicts arts. 43, 48 (Protocol I) 
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
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 (ii) civilians taking a direct part in hostilities;23 and 
 (iii) in so far as objects are concerned, those objects which 
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial de-
struction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances rul-
ing at the time, offers a deªnite military advantage.24
The major IHL treaty instruments at present are the two Additional 
Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Protocol I (AP I) 
addresses international armed conºict and Protocol II (AP II) refers to 
internal armed conºict.25 The United States has not ratiªed either 
treaty, although the countries of the former Yugoslavia have done so. 
For the most part, however, the provisions of AP I and AP II referred to 
in this article would be regarded as binding all states because they re-
ºect current customary law. 
A. Deªnition of Combatants 
 Military objectives, in terms of people, are combatants and civilians 
directly participating in hostilities. Combatants are members of the 
armed forces of a party to a conºict, other than medical personnel and 
chaplains.26 Combatants have the right to participate directly in hostili-
ties (i.e., shoot at the enemy) at any time and, for that reason, they may 
also be attacked at any time--sleeping, eating, and marching to the rear, 
unless they have surrendered or are injured and have ceased to take 
part in hostilities. Wounded combatants who continue to ªght may be 
lawfully attacked. Although, strictly speaking, the concept of combatant 
status is legally relevant only during international armed conºicts, as is 
the related concept of prisoner of war status, the concept is applicable 
by analogy to internal conºict. As a result, the members of the armed 
forces of all parties to an internal conºict (other than medical person-
nel and chaplains) would also be subject to lawful attack at all times 
unless they have surrendered or are injured and have ceased to take 
part in hostilities. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has explicitly addressed 
the situation of members of a Territorial Defense (TO) organization in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and whether they should be con-
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. art. 51(3). 
24 Id. art. 52(2). 
25 See generally AP I, supra note 22; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 
August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
ºicts (Protocol II) June 8, 1977, 26 I.L.M. 561, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
26 AP I, supra note 22, art. 43(2). 
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sidered combatants at all times during a conºict or only when they di-
rectly take part in hostilities. The Chamber concluded that “members 
of the armed forces residing in their homes in the area of the conºict, 
as well as members of the TO residing in their homes, remain combat-
ants whether or not they are in combat, or for the time being armed.”27
B. Deªnition of Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities 
 The concept of civilians directly participating in hostilities is 
much more contentious and much more complicated. Armed forces 
of many western states have begun to outsource to meet many of their 
requirements. As a result, private contractors may provide both spe-
cialist services (such as technical representatives for the maintenance 
of complicated weapons systems) and more routine services (such as 
logistical support and provision of food services), which had previ-
ously been provided by military personnel. This is a return to the be-
ginning of the modern period when specialists, even artillery person-
nel, were civilians. Furthermore, some key civilian personnel, defense 
scientists for example, may be much more important to the war effort 
than most military personnel. In the territory of the former Yugosla-
via, an additional complicating factor was the fact that, at least in the 
early stages, new states were emerging and were required to create 
new armed forces as the conºict went on. Although the matter is not 
beyond dispute, the concept of civilians participating directly in hos-
tilities should be narrowly construed. “Direct participation in hostili-
ties implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged 
in and harm done to the enemy at the time and place where the activ-
ity takes place.”28 Hostile acts: 
[S]hould be understood to be acts which by their nature and 
purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel 
and equipment of the armed forces. . . . There should be a 
clear distinction between direct participation in hostilities and 
participation in the war effort. The latter is often required 
from the population as a whole to various degrees. Without 
                                                                                                                      
27 Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 51 (Dec. 17, 
2004). 
28 Id. ¶ 1679, at 516. 
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such a distinction the efforts made to reafªrm and develop in-
ternational humanitarian law could become meaningless.29
Civilians are military objectives only while they are taking a direct part 
in hostilities, not before and not after. When making targeting deci-
sions, in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall 
be considered a civilian. These propositions reºect customary law and 
are codiªed in AP I.30 Essentially the same standard applies to inter-
nal conºicts as a result of Article 13 of AP II and Article 3 common to 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, although the latter uses the 
expression “persons taking no active part in hostilities” which, it is 
submitted, is synonymous with taking no direct part in hostilities.31
 The direct participation in hostilities issue was addressed, but not 
in depth, in the Strugar Judgment. Civilian Mato Valjalo, who was 
wounded in the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik, was a driver for 
the Dubrovnik Municipal Crisis Staff. The Chamber concluded, without 
analysis, that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that, as a 
driver, he was taking an active part in hostilities.32
C. Military Objectives 
 Article 52(2) of AP I states in part: 
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are lim-
ited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose 
or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a deªnite mili-
tary advantage.33
                                                                                                                      
29 AP I, supra note 22, ¶¶ 1942, 1945; see also Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, at 618–619 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
30 AP I, supra note 22, arts. 43(1), 50(1), 51(2)–(3). 
31 AP II, supra note 25, art. 13; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 
3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
32 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01–42-T, Judgement, ¶ 274 ( Jan. 31, 2005). 
33 AP I, supra note 22, art. 52(2). 
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Paragraph 3 of the Article indicates that in case of doubt over whether 
an object, which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, is being 
used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be 
presumed not to be so used. The deªnition has two elements: 
 (i) That the nature, location, purpose, or use of the object 
must make an effective contribution to military action; and 
 (ii) That the total or partial destruction, capture, or neu-
tralisation of the object must offer a deªnite military advan-
tage in the circumstances ruling at the time. 
 States which have ratiªed AP I, and most other states, would accept 
the AP I deªnition of military objective as a reasonably accurate deªni-
tion applicable as a matter of customary law to all conºicts.34 The 
deªnition is supposed to provide a means whereby informed objective 
observers (and decision makers in a conºict) can determine whether a 
particular object constitutes a military objective. It accomplishes this 
purpose in simple cases. Everyone will agree that a munitions factory is 
a military objective and that an unoccupied church is a civilian object. 
When the deªnition is applied to dual-use objects, which have some 
civilian uses and some actual or potential military uses (such as com-
munications systems, transportation systems, petrochemical complexes, 
or manufacturing plants of some types), opinions may differ. The ap-
plication of the deªnition to particular objects may also differ depend-
ing on the scope and objectives of the conºict. Further, the scope and 
objectives of the conºict may change during the conºict. Although 
representatives of the U.S. government have at times indicated that the 
AP I deªnition of military objective does reºect customary law,35 it 
should be noted that the United States appears to have adopted a sub-
stantially broader deªnition of military objective for its Military Com-
mission Instructions: 
“Military objectives” are those potential targets during an 
armed conºict which by their nature, location, purpose, or 
use, effectively contribute to the opposing force’s war-ªghting 
or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruc-
tion, capture, or neutralization would constitute a military ad-
                                                                                                                      
34 Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, 29–32 ( Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 
Vol. I] (Rule 8). 
35 Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. II: Practice, Pt I, 187–88 
( Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Henckaerts & 
Doswald-Beck, Vol. II]. 
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vantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the times 
of the attack.36
Certainly the reference to “war-sustaining capability” appears to be an 
extension beyond the AP I deªnition. 
 A number of issues remain unresolved in connection with the 
scope of the military objective concept, including: 
 (i) Should more or fewer things be regarded as military ob-
jectives by the intervening side during a humanitarian inter-
vention or by the “good” side during an international armed 
conºict?37
 (ii) Is civilian morale a military objective?38
 (iii) Is the political leadership a legitimate target?39
To a considerable extent, the debate concerning what should consti-
tute a military objective has yet to be commenced and it clearly will be 
when, and if, a case concerning air bombardment is prosecuted. Cases 
brought before the ICTY to date have been concerned primarily with 
ground combat, and identiªcation of military objectives has tended to 
be a relatively simple task since the objectives are usually troop con-
centrations or weapons emplacements.40
III. Proportionality 
 Where unlawful attacks are concerned, proportionality is the ratio 
between the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated and the 
                                                                                                                      
36 U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes and Elements 
for Trial by Military Commission § 5D (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink. 
mil/news/May2003/d20030430milcominstno2.pdf. 
37 The author tends to be a bit reluctant to distinguish between the good and the bad 
side for the purposes of applying IHL. But see Charles.J. Dunlap, Jr., The End of Innocence: 
Rethinking Non-Combatancy in the Post-Kosovo Era, in Strategic Review 4 (Summer 2000). 
38 See Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Façade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Tar-
geting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 Air Force L. Rev. 143, 143–82 (2001) 
(for a vigorous statement of the view that enemy civilian moral has traditionally been a 
legitimate military objective and that the AP I deªnition of military objective should be 
interpreted to encompass attacks on morale targets). 
39 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 21–40. 
40 See ICTY:  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ( June 8, 2001), 
39 I.L.M. 1257–1283 (2000) [hereinafter OTP Report] (discussing the one exception to 
this rule, and in particular, the NATO attack on the headquarters and studios of Serbian 
State Television and Radio in central Belgrade on April 23, 1999, which did not involve 
litigation). 
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incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian 
objects anticipated from an attack directed against a military objective. 
 The concept of proportionality is linked to the principle of distinc-
tion, which is the fundamental legal principle underlying combat activ-
ity. Although the concept has been a part of IHL for a long time, it did 
not appear in treaty texts until the development of AP I in 1974–77. 
The concept is important because military objectives, civilians, and ci-
vilian objectives are too frequently located in the same area. Civilians 
and civilian objects do not have absolute immunity from the effects of 
combat. Attacks directed against military objectives are lawful unless 
they are anticipated to cause disproportionate civilian losses. It is not 
practicable to determine whether civilian casualties are lawful or unlaw-
ful until there have been prior determinations of whether the attack, 
which caused the civilian casualties, was directed against a military ob-
jective, and if so, whether disproportionate civilian casualties were an-
ticipated. If disproportionate civilian casualties are caused, that may 
provide the basis for an inference that such casualties were anticipated. 
 The word “proportionality” is not used in AP I, but is implicitly 
contained in several of its provisions,41 which refer to a prohibition on 
attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”42 “Excessive,” considered in context, is syn-
onymous with “disproportionate.”43 In the context of the law related to 
unlawful attacks, proportionality is relevant simply for assessing the 
relative values of two essentially unlike concepts, military advantage and 
civilian losses. Since the relative values are essentially unlike, precise 
valuation is difªcult. It is not a simple accounting exercise. The best 
one can say is that if similar things are being measured, such as human 
lives, usually each life must be given a similar value. 
A. Application of the Proportionality Concept 
 Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide simple answers concern-
ing the application of the concept of proportionality to concrete mili-
                                                                                                                      
41 See AP I, supra note 22, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b), 85(3)(c). 
42 Id. art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added). 
43 Id. The ICC Statute contains an analogous expression “clearly excessive.” See Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
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tary situations, because of a lack of examples in legal decisions or legal 
literature. The following analysis provides a rough frame of reference. 
 First, who decides whether an action is disproportionate? The Galic 
Trial Chamber held that the decision maker should be regarded as “a 
reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual 
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him 
or her.”44 Second, what is compared? The comparison is between the 
anticipated concrete and direct military advantage and the anticipated 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian ob-
jects, or combination thereof. The actual results of the attack may assist 
in inferring the intent of the attacker, but what counts is what was in 
the mind of the decision maker when the attack was launched. Third, 
what is the standard? The attack is prohibited if it is anticipated that it 
will result in excessive civilian losses.45 Fourth, what is the scope of the 
“concrete and direct military advantage anticipated?” The Galic Trial 
Chamber referred to several sources in addressing this point: 
The travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol I indicate 
that the expression “concrete and direct” was intended to 
show that the advantage must be “substantial and relatively 
close”, and that “advantages which are hardly perceptible 
and those which would only appear in the long term should 
be disregarded. . . .” The [International Committee of the 
Red Cross] Commentary explains that “a military advantage 
can only consist in ground gained or in annihilating or in 
weakening the enemy armed forces.”46
The military advantage gained by a successful attack on a military ob-
jective may vary depending on the circumstances. For example, a suc-
cessful attack on a military objective, such as an artillery emplacement, 
always gives the attacker a military advantage, but the extent of the di-
rect and concrete direct military advantage gained may vary depending 
on several factors, such as location of the objective and its current or 
potential use. 
 Fifth, what scale should be used in assessing proportionality? 
Should proportionality be assessed based on an attack on a single mili-
tary objective, a battle, a campaign, or a war? Several states made state-
ments of understanding concerning the application of “military advan-
                                                                                                                      
44 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 58 (Dec. 5, 2003). 
45 See AP I, supra note 22, art. 51(5)(b). 
46 Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, ¶ 58, n. 106, (citing Yves Sandoz et al., supra note 29, 
¶¶ 2209, 2218). 
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tage,” considered in the context of Articles 51, 52, and 57 when ratify-
ing or acceding to AP I.47 The Statement by Canada is representative: 
It is the understanding of the Government of Canada in re-
lation to Articles 51(5)(b), 52(2), and 57(2)(a)(iii) that the 
military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to 
refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack consid-
ered as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of 
the attack.48
These Statements of Understanding notwithstanding, it is suggested 
that proportionality can be determined using a variety of scales rang-
ing from the tactical level (military objective by military objective), to 
a much bigger scale, as long as the more general context is also taken 
into account.49 For example, if it is essential to block military trafªc 
across a river and the enemy forces may use three bridges to cross the 
river, it may well be permissible to inºict greater collateral losses for 
destroying the last bridge because of the resultant greater military ad-
vantage. The military objective scale is commonly used in modern 
state practice, particularly in assessing the legitimacy of aerial at-
tacks.50 It was also used by the Galic Trial Chamber.51
 No tribunal to date has ever explicitly determined, in a well articu-
lated manner, that disproportionate damage was caused when assessing 
an incident in which the disproportionate impact of the attack was not 
blatant or conspicuous. The Galic Trial Chamber, however, was com-
pelled to grapple with the issue in its discussion of one shelling inci-
dent, the shelling of the Dobrinje football tournament on June 1, 1993. 
In that incident, about 200 spectators, including women and children, 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Documents on the Laws of War 499–512 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff 
eds., 2000). 
48 Id. at 503. 
49 In an earlier article, the author expressed the view that the AP I proportionality pro-
visions would probably not be applicable below a divisional level attack. The earlier view 
was premised on the assumption that there could be such a thing as an attack which was 
disproportionate but which was not, in substance, directed against civilians or civilian ob-
jects. Whether or not that assumption was valid, in the cases which have been prosecuted 
to date a de facto higher threshold has been used and the argument advanced has been 
that the attack was so disproportionate that it must be regarded as directed against civilians 
or civilian objects. See William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conven-
tional Warfare, 98 Mil. L. Rev. 91, 112 (1982). 
50 See James E. Baker, Judging Kosovo: The Legal Process, The Law of Armed Conºict, The 
Commander and Chief, 78 Int’l. L. Stud. 7, 7–18 (2002). The various incident studies re-
ferred to in OTP Report are also informative. See generally OTP Report, supra note 40. 
51 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 387 (Dec. 5, 2003). 
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were watching a football game in the corner of a parking lot, which was 
bound on three sides by six story apartments and on the fourth side by 
a hill. Two shells exploded in the parking lot killing between 12 and 16 
persons and wounding between 80 and 140 persons. The players and 
many of the spectators were military personnel and, as such, military 
objectives. The Commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ABiH 5th Motorized Dobrinja Brigade), to which the soldiers be-
longed, ªled a report indicating there were 11 killed and 87 wounded 
(6 combatants killed and 55 wounded, 5 civilians killed and 32 
wounded).52 Although assessing proportionality is not a simple exercise 
in number crunching, it would be difªcult to conclude that, in this in-
cident, there were disproportionate civilian casualties, unless one 
makes the arbitrary determination that civilian lives count more than 
military lives. The majority of the chamber ªnessed a requirement to 
assess the proportionality of the result by focusing on the mens rea of 
the perpetrators and on the fact that civilian casualties were caused: 
Although the number of soldiers present at the game was sig-
niªcant, an attack on a crowd of approximately 200 people, 
including numerous children, would clearly be expected to 
cause incidental loss of life and injuries to civilians excessive 
in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage an-
ticipated.53
IV. Legal Basis for Unlawful Attack Charges 
 Unlawful attacks are not enumerated offences in the ICTY Statute. 
Before the ICTY unlawful attacks must be charged as unenumerated 
offences under Article 3 of the Statute, which is concerned with viola-
tions of the laws or customs of war. As a result of the Tadic Jurisdiction 
Appeal Decision, all unenumerated offences must meet the following 
four general criteria: 
 (i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule 
of international humanitarian law; 
 (ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs 
to treaty law, [the treaty must 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. ¶ 377. 
53 Id. ¶ 387. 
2007] Legal Standards for Combat Activities 127 
 (a) bind the parties at the time of the offence (including 
being applicable to the type of conºict in which the incident 
occurred), and 
 (b) not be in conºict with or derogate from a peremptory 
norm of international law]54
 (iii) the violation must be “serious”, that is to say, it must 
constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, 
and the breach must involve grave consequences for the vic-
tim . . . ; 
 (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary 
or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of 
the person breaching the rule.55
The potential legal sources for the unlawful attack offenses were cus-
tomary international law, the APs,56 and the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC).57 Since the ICC Statute was not adopted 
until 1998, well after most of the offences within the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY were committed, and since that Statute (i) applies only to crimes 
committed after it came into force,58 and (ii) formulates unlawful at-
tack offences in a way which might be more restrictive than customary 
law or pre-existing treaty law, the OTP relied upon customary law and 
the APs to provide the legal basis for its unlawful attack charges. 
 The OTP charged unlawful attacks in the Strugar case using the 
following representative formulations, which were upheld by the Ap-
peals Chamber:59
 (i) “[A]ttacks on civilians, a Violation of the Laws or Cus-
toms of War, as recognized by Article 51 of Additional Proto-
col I and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949”, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1) 
and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal. 
 (ii) “[U]nlawful attacks on civilian objects, a violation of the 
laws or customs of war, as recognized by Article 52 of Addi-
tional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949”, and 
                                                                                                                      
54 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 143 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
55 Id. ¶ 94. 
56 AP I, supra note 22, art. 48; AP II, supra note 25, art. 13. 
57 ICC Statute, supra note 43, art. 8. 
58 Id. art. 11. 
59 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶¶ 
9–15 (Nov. 22, 2002). 
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customary law, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1) and 7(3) 
of the Statute of the Tribunal.60
 Bearing in mind the precise wording of the Appeals Chamber in 
the Strugar Jurisdiction Decision, in the future it might be preferable: 
(a) to include a reference to customary law before the reference to Ar-
ticle 51 in the attack on civilians charge because of the importance of 
customary law to underpin the offense; and (b) to delete “unlawful” 
from the formulation of the attack on civilian objects charge, as all at-
tacks on civilian objects are unlawful. In accordance with the Galic Trial 
Judgment, these formulations embrace direct, indiscriminate, and dis-
proportionate attacks.61  In its judgment, the Blaskic Trial Chamber 
considered the duration of the unlawful attack (the overrunning of 
small villages) to include actions that occurred while control over the 
villages was still in dispute. The Appeals Chamber also held in the Stru-
gar Jurisdiction Decision that attacks on civilians and on civilian objects 
were prohibited under customary law.62 Although the Chamber was not 
extremely explicit, it would appear that the customary law prohibition 
applies in all conºicts.63
A. Attacks on Civilian Populations 
 The Tadic Jurisdiction Appeal Decision has provided the OTP with 
a basis for arguing that certain offenses have a substantially similar legal 
content in both international and internal conºicts.64 The OTP has, 
therefore, developed and defended the practice of alleging unlawful 
attack charges, which are common to all conºicts. In order to evade the 
conºict classiªcation issue, the ICTY OTP has rooted its unlawful at-
tack-on-civilians charges in identically worded provisions of AP I (which 
applies to international conºicts) and AP II (which applies to internal 
conºicts). Both Article 51(2) of AP I and Article 13(2) of AP II state in 
part: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. ¶¶ 4, 277. 
61 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 57–61 (Dec. 5, 
2003). 
62 Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶¶ 9–10, 13. The 
Trial Chamber in its subsequent Judgment explicitly concluded that the general rule pro-
hibiting attacks on civilian objects applied to internal conºicts as a matter of customary 
law notwithstanding the absence of an Article in AP II similar to Article 52 of AP I. See 
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 224 ( Jan. 31, 2005). 
63 See Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 224. 
64 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 96–127 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
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shall not be the object of attack.”65 AP I, however, goes on to refer to 
other forms of unlawful attack. In particular, Article 51 refers to indis-
criminate attacks, including disproportionate attacks, and refers to ªve 
forms of indiscriminate attack, all of which are prohibited.66 In addi-
tion, Article 85 contains grave breach provisions relating to unlawful 
attacks. By contrast, AP II has no provisions related to unlawful attacks 
on civilians beyond the single sentence in Article 13(2) quoted ear-
lier.67
 ICTY OTP practice has been to focus on the common sentence in 
Article 51(2) of AP I and Article 13(2) of AP II, and to argue that proof 
of the occurrence of the various types of indiscriminate attacks, includ-
ing disproportionate attacks, may provide an evidentiary basis for the 
Trial Chamber to draw an inference that the attacks were, in substance, 
directed against the civilian population. In other words, the OTP has 
argued that the essential substance of the detailed AP I provisions, con-
cerning unlawful attacks applicable to international conºicts, are also 
contained in the single relevant sentence in AP II, which is applicable 
to internal conºicts. This is a conscious effort on the part of the OTP, 
successful to date, to argue that the law concerning unlawful attacks 
against civilians is the same substantively in both international and in-
ternal conºicts. An essentially similar approach has been accepted in 
the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study.68
B. Attacks on Civilian Objects 
 The basis for the unlawful attack against civilian objects charge is a 
bit different. Article 52(1) of AP I states in part: “Civilian objects shall 
not be the object of attack or reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects 
which are not military objectives . . . .”69 There is no similar general 
provision in AP II. There are, however, prohibitions on attacking spe-
ciªc civilian objects, including objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population,70 works and installations containing dangerous 
forces,71 and cultural objects and places of worship.72 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                      
65 AP I, supra note 22, art. 51(2); AP II, supra note 25, art. 13(2). 
66 See AP I, supra note 22, art. 51. 
67 AP II, supra note 25, art. 13(2). 
68 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Vol. I, supra note 34, at 3–8, 37–50 (Rules 1, 11–
14). 
69 AP I, supra note 22, art. 52(1). 
70 AP II, supra note 25, art. 14. 
71 Id. art. 15. 
72 Id. art. 16. 
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U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2675, on Basic Principles 
for the Protection of the Civilian Population, on Dec. 9, 1970.73 These 
Principles include: 
In the conduct of military operations, every effort should be 
made to spare civilian populations from the ravages of war, 
and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury, 
loss or damage to civilian populations. . . . Dwellings and 
other installations that are used only by civilian populations 
should not be the object of military operations.74
UNGA Res 2675 applies to all armed conºicts. As indicated in the Tadic 
Jurisdiction Appeal Decision, these resolutions were “declaratory of the 
principles of customary international law regarding the protection of 
civilian populations and property in armed conºicts of any kind . . . .”75 
The ICRC customary law study adopts a similar approach.76
 As indicated above, the OTP has rooted its unlawful attack charges 
in customary law and in the APs, and not in the ICC Statute where the 
wording is somewhat different. The APs were initially adopted in 1977 
and have a ªrmer customary law basis than the 1998 ICC Statute. The 
ICC Statute contains different enumerated lists of war crimes for inter-
national conºicts77 and for internal conºicts.78 Unenumerated of-
fences may not be charged under the ICC Statute. The relevant ICC 
offences include: (1) for international conºicts—intentional attacks on 
civilians,79 intentional attacks on civilian objects,80 intentionally launch-
ing attacks that are expected to cause disproportionate incidental civil-
ian losses or damage;81 and (2) for internal conºicts—intentional at-
tacks on civilians.82
 Reliance on the ICC Statute by the OTP, which is debatable be-
cause it was not drafted until after most of the offenses within the 
ICTY’s jurisdiction were committed, would be helpful because proof of 
the effect of the unlawful attack (death or injury to civilians, damage to 
                                                                                                                      
73 G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 9, 1970). 
74 Id. § 3, 5. 
75 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 112 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
76 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Vol. I, supra note 34, at 25–36 (Rules 7–10). 
77 ICC Statute, supra note 43, art. 8(2)(a) and (b). 
78 Id. art. 8(2)(c) and (e). 
79 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(i). 
80 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ii). 
81 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
82 ICC Statute, supra note 43, art. 8(2)(d)(i). 
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civilian objects) is not an element of the offense. As a purely practical 
matter, however, it is unlikely that the offence would ever be charged 
unless the effect actually occurred, and it would usually be necessary to 
prove the effect as part of the circumstantial evidence for proof of the 
mental element. The OTP has utilized the grave breach provisions of 
Article 85(3) of AP I in developing its elements and AP I does require 
proof of effect. There are, however, aspects of the ICC unlawful attack 
offences that are not helpful. In particular: (1) the OTP uses the AP I 
mental element of “willful,” which includes a degree of recklessness, 
while the ICC mental element is intentional, which may not include a 
degree of recklessness; (2) the OTP uses the AP I formulation for pro-
portionality which is “excessive” while the ICC formulation is “clearly 
excessive,” which may be higher; and (3) the ICC Statute prohibits a 
narrower range of attacks in internal conºicts that the OTP, relying on 
the Tadic Jurisdiction decision, has not been able to prosecute. 
V. Elements of Unlawful Attack Charges 
A. The Charge of Unlawful Attacks on Civilians 
 For cases before the ICTY, the elements of the unlawful attacks on 
civilians charge are as indicated in the Galic Trial Judgment (subject to 
the modiªcation of the mens rea element required by the Blaskic Appeal 
Judgment). In Galic, the Trial Chamber accepted that the mental ele-
ment for the offense of unlawful attack was “willful” and  that the ap-
proach taken in the grave breach provisions of AP I was appropriate. 
Speciªcally, it held: 
The Commentary to Article 85 of Additional Protocol I ex-
plains the term as follows: 
 wilfully: the accused must have acted consciously and with 
intent, i.e., with his mind on the act and its consequences, and 
willing them (‘criminal intent’ or ‘malice aforethought’); this 
encompasses the concepts of ‘wrongful intent’ or ‘reckless-
ness’, viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain 
of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; 
on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is 
not covered, i.e., when a man acts without having his mind on 
the act or its consequences. 
 The Trial Chamber accepts this explanation, according to 
which the notion of “wilfully” incorporates the concept of 
132 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:111 
recklessness, whilst excluding mere negligence. The perpetra-
tor who recklessly attacks civilians acts “wilfully”.83
The approach to the concept of recklessness must, however, be modi-
ªed as a result of the holding of the Appeal Chamber in Blaskic to the 
effect that the knowledge of any sort of risk is not sufªcient for the im-
position of criminal responsibility, and that an accused must be aware 
of the “substantial likelihood” that the actus reus of the crime will oc-
cur.84
 The Galic Trial Chamber then went on to decide that the elements 
for the charge are the elements common to all unenumerated offences 
under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, and the following speciªc ele-
ments: 
 1. Acts of violence directed against the civilian population 
or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities caus-
ing death or serious injury to body or health within the civil-
ian population. 
 2. The offender wilfully made the civilian population or in-
dividual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object 
of those acts of violence.85
It added, “indiscriminate attacks, that is to say, attacks which strike civil-
ians or civilian objects and military objectives without distinction, may 
qualify as direct attacks against civilians.”86 Further, the Trial Chamber 
considered that “certain apparently disproportionate attacks may give 
rise to the inference that civilians were actually the object of attack. 
This is to be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the available 
evidence.”87  “To establish the mens rea of a disproportionate attack the 
Prosecution must prove. . .that the attack was launched wilfully and in 
knowledge of circumstances giving rise to the expectation of excessive 
civilian casualties.”88 The Trial Chamber went on to observe that the 
failure of a party to comply with its obligation to remove civilians, to the 
                                                                                                                      
83 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 54 (Dec. 5, 
2003) (quoting ICRC Commentary, supra note 46, ¶ 3474). 
84 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT--95-14-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶¶ 41–42 ( July 29, 
2004). 
85 Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, ¶ 56. 
86 Id. ¶ 57. 
87 Id. ¶ 60. 
88 Id. ¶ 59; see Kravetz, supra note 17, at 532 (criticizing that court’s ªnding by arguing 
that disproportionate attacks should not come within the deªnition of the crime of attack 
on civilians). 
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maximum extent feasible, from the vicinity of military objectives did 
not “relieve the attacking side of its duty to abide by the principles of 
distinction and proportionality when launching an attack.”89 The Trial 
Chamber did allude to the possibility that proof of results was not an 
element of the offence of unlawful attack on civilians.90
 The Appeals Chamber, in the Kordic Judgment, issued after the 
Galic Trial Judgment, reviewed the state of the law concerning the re-
quirement for proof of results, and concluded that there was such a 
requirement under customary law at the time of the offence.91 In a cor-
rigendum to the same judgment, the Appeals Chamber corrected an 
error made in earlier trial judgments, which appeared to hold that civil-
ians or civilian objects could be attacked if justiªed by military necessity 
and held “the prohibition against attacking civilians and civilian objects 
may not be derogated from because of military necessity.”92
B. The Charge of Unlawful Attacks on Civilian Objects 
 The speciªc elements for the unlawful attacks on civilian objects 
charge are, mutatis mutandis, the same as those for unlawful attacks on 
civilians spelled out in the Galic Trial Judgment: 
 1. Acts of violence directed against civilian objects causing 
damage to civilian objects; and 
 2. The offender wilfully made civilian objects the object of 
these acts of violence.93
“Wilfull” has the same meaning here as it does for attacks on civilians. 
 Although the elements for the analogous ICC offences do not re-
quire proof of results (with the exception of Article 8(2)(b)(iv)—war 
crime of excessive incidental death, injury, or damage), the ICC of-
fenses appear to be narrower than the ICTY offences prosecuted to 
date as the ICTY has prosecuted for unlawful attacks against civilian 
objects in all conºicts.  In addition, the elements are more restrictive 
                                                                                                                      
89 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 61 (Dec. 5, 
2003). 
90 See id. ¶ 43. 
91 Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶¶ 55–68 (Dec. 17, 
2004). 
92 Id. ¶ 54; Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Corrigendum to Judgement of 
17 December 2004 ( Jan. 26, 2005). 
93 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 56 (Dec. 5, 
2003). The Strugar Trial Chamber indicated that it was unclear whether the damage to 
civilian objects must be extensive but noted that, in any event, the damage was extensive in 
the particular case. Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 280 ( Jan. 31, 2005). 
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than the offenses set forth in the APs, as they appear to have a narrower 
mens rea (“intentional” in lieu of “willfulness”). 
VI. Relationship Between Unlawful Attack Charges  
and Other Charges 
 Proof that an unlawful attack occurred is a prerequisite for deter-
mining whether other offenses also occurred in a combat situation. 
Where the crime base consists of shelling or sniping incidents in a 
combat environment, it must ªrst be proved that death, injury, or dam-
age was caused by an unlawful attack (that is, one directed against civil-
ians or civilian objects, or one directed against a military objective that 
may be expected to cause disproportionate incidental losses), before 
determining whether the additional elements necessary to establish the 
commission of other offences have been established. If the attack was 
not unlawful then the resultant death, injury, or damage cannot be 
unlawful. If a civilian is killed or injured during an attack on a military 
objective, which was not reasonably expected to result in civilian casual-
ties or damage to civilian objects disproportionate to the expected mili-
tary advantage, then no crime has been committed because it is a lawful 
act of war. This is true even if there is an expectation that some civilians 
may be killed or injured during the attack. 
 There is no basis for a crime against humanity charge because the 
attack was directed against a military objective, not against civilians or 
civilian objects. There is no basis for a war crimes charge of murder be-
cause the mens rea is lacking. The intent was to perform a lawful act. 
The unlawful attack foundation is essential to the assessment of legality, 
even if there is no unlawful attack charge relating to a particular com-
bat related incident. The issue cannot be avoided by simply avoiding 
the charge. There can be some incidents in which it is so clear that the 
attack is directed against civilians that one can proceed with a persecu-
tion count, or a war crime, or crime against humanity count of murder. 
Even in such circumstances, however, it is essential that the prosecutor, 
in making charging decisions, and the court in assessing the facts, take 
into account the unlawful attack elements, at least implicitly, before 
coming to the conclusion that counts charged have been proven. 
 The Galic Trial Chamber, seemingly without enthusiasm, accepted 
and applied the OTP submission that proof of an unlawful attack was a 
prerequisite for proof of other offences related to shelling or sniping: 
The Prosecution submits that, in the context of an armed 
conºict, the determination that an attack is unlawful in light 
of treaty and customary international law with respect to the 
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principles of distinction and proportionality is critical in de-
termining whether the general requirements of Article 5 have 
been met. Otherwise, according to the Prosecution, unin-
tended civilian casualties resulting from a lawful attack on le-
gitimate military objectives would amount to a crime against 
humanity under Article 5 and lawful combat would, in effect, 
become impossible. It therefore submits that an accused may 
be found guilty of a crime against humanity if he launches an 
unlawful attack against persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities when the general requirements of Article 5 have 
been established. The Trial Chamber accepts that when con-
sidering the general requirements of Article 5, the body of 
laws of war plays an important part in the assessment of the 
legality of the acts committed in the course of an armed con-
ºict and whether the population may be said to have been 
targeted as such.94
VII. Establishing the Big Picture 
 Since unlawful attack counts will require reference to multiple in-
cidents, and it would be impracticable to introduce detailed evidence 
concerning each incident, it will be necessary to develop a way for get-
ting from the micro to the macro level in presenting the case. 
 In the Galic case, hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded in 
Sarajevo by shelling or sniping during the period covered by the in-
dictment, 1992–1994. It would be impracticable to treat each incident 
of killing as a separate murder case. A way had to be developed to get 
from the speciªc incident at the micro level to what was alleged to be 
an unlawful shelling or sniping campaign at the macro level. Indeed, 
the link from the micro to the macro level was essential to the case. If, 
for example, the prosecution could prove, with a degree of precision 
in a manageable time, that twenty sniping incidents have occurred 
over a two-year period while the accused was responsible for 15,000 
soldiers in the front lines, in the absence of direct evidence of rele-
vant orders being given, would a reasonable court conclude that the 
commander bears command responsibility for the sniping or that he 
must have ordered such acts? On the other hand, if the prosecutor 
could establish both the occurrence of the twenty incidents and an 
                                                                                                                      
94 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 144 (Dec. 5, 
2003). 
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adequate link to what appears to be a much broader crime base, it 
might be much easier for the court to reach such conclusions. 
 Presumably, the preferred approach would be to determine in 
some scientiªcally valid fashion the entire apparent crime base. For ex-
ample, if it appears from sound medical evidence that 1000 civilians 
have been killed by sniper ªre from forces under the command of X, 
the prosecutor could pick a statistically valid sample on something simi-
lar to a random numbers basis for a more detailed examination. De-
tailed evidence concerning all cases in the sample group would then be 
put before the court. If that was done, or if the prosecutor made the 
court aware of incidents or situations in the sample group, which do 
not indicate unlawful acts occurred, then the court could conclude that 
seventy percent of the cases in the sample group constituted crimes, 
therefore seventy percent of the larger group also constituted crimes, 
and therefore a campaign of unlawful sniping occurred. 
 Desirable as the mathematical/scientiªc approach might be, it is 
not always practicable. The Galic prosecution team listed scheduled 
sniping and shelling incidents as “representative allegations” in annexes 
to the indictment. The prosecution also introduced evidence of un-
scheduled incidents, survey or impressionistic evidence, and solid 
demographic evidence, which could adequately establish cause of death 
or injury, but which did not, in and of itself, establish whether the death 
or injury was the result of unlawful acts. 
 The majority in the Trial Chamber held that a campaign of mili-
tary actions in the area of Sarajevo, involving widespread or systematic 
shelling and sniping of civilians, resulting in civilian death or injury ex-
isted together with a lawful military campaign directed against military 
objectives.95 Civilians were directly or indiscriminately attacked and, at 
a minimum, hundreds of civilians were killed, and thousands of others 
were injured.96 The reasons for this ªnding included: 
(a) No civilian activity and no areas of Sarajevo held by the ABiH 
seemed to be safe from sniping or shelling attacks from SRK-
held territory;97
(b) Indeed, speciªc areas of the city became notorious as sources of 
sniper ªre directed at civilians;98
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. ¶¶ 582–583. 
96 Id. ¶ 591. 
97 Id. ¶ 584. 
98 Id. ¶ 585. 
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(c) Although civilians adapted to the environment by taking precau-
tionary measures, they were still not safe from deliberate at-
tack;99
(d) The evidence of residents of Sarajevo and of victims was supported 
by the evidence of international military personnel;100
(e) Although there was some evidence that ABiH forces attacked their 
own civilians to attract the attention of the international com-
munity, that stray bullets may have struck some civilians, and 
that some civilians were shot in the honest belief they were 
combatants, evidence in the Trial Record conclusively estab-
lishes that the pattern of ªre throughout the city of Sarajevo 
was that of indiscriminate or direct ªre at civilians in ABiH-
held areas of Sarajevo from SRK-controlled territory not that 
of combat ªre where civilians were accidentally hit;101 and 
(f) Fire into ABiH-held areas of Sarajevo followed a temporal pattern.102
Conclusion 
 There are some things judicial decisions can contribute and some 
they are unlikely to contribute to the common discourse on the princi-
ple of distinction. In particular, it is unlikely there will be many deci-
sions clarifying the scope of the military objective concept because, as a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion (and cost), it is unlikely prosecutors 
will submit indictments related to “gray area” targets. The most impor-
tant contribution of ICTY jurisprudence is the simple demonstration 
that competent prosecution, defense, and adjudication of unlawful at-
tack cases is not only possible, but that it is not beyond the practical 
competence of non-specialist tribunals. ICTY cases, such as Galic and 
Strugar, demonstrate how such cases can be prosecuted in the future. As 
a former military legal adviser, I would be the last to downgrade the 
importance of preventive law in ensuring that appropriate legal advice 
is injected into the operational decision making process so that 
breaches of the law do not occur in the ªrst place. It is, however, ex-
tremely reassuring to know that there is now an additional arrow in the 
legal quiver and that effective prosecution is also practicable when nec-
essary. 
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